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Abstract 
We examine transfers and tied aid in a model with increasing returns to scale and 
monopolistic ompetition. Transfers give rise to an additional (love of variety) welfare 
effect and affect the utility possibility locus. Generic tied aid may exacerbate or reverse 
these results. The popularity of aid tied to specific manufactured goods can be explained 
through rent-seeking behavior since such aid gives rise to profits in the donor country. 
These profits in turn largely repatriate the transfer such that donors can appear to be more 
generous than they really are. 
Keywords: Tied aid; Monopolistic ompetition 
JEL classification." F0; F35; O1 
1. Introduction 
There exists a substantial literature on the welfare effects 0f  unilateral transfers 
(foreign aid) between countries. 1 Recent attention has shifted to the analysis of  
* Erasmus University Rotterdam, H8-13, Dep. of International Economics, P.O. Box 1738, 3000 DR 
Rotterdam, The Netherlands. 
1 See e.g. Ohyama (1974), Gale (1974), Chichilnisky (1980) and Bhagwati et al. (1983), Bhagwati et 
al. (1985). For an historical debate of the transfer problem see Chipman (1966), for a survey see Jones 
and Neary (1984). 
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tied aid. 2 All  these studies, however, assume perfect competition, constant returns 
to scale and price taking behavior by the producers and consumers and therefore 
fail to take into account he developments in trade modeling for the past decade or 
so, emphasizing scale economies, imperfect competition and product differentia- 
tion. 3 Traditional trade models cannot explain the empirical 'stylized facts' while 
the models incorporating the features mentioned above, developed e.g. by Ethier 
and Horn (1984) or Markusen (1986), are able to explain these empirical observa- 
tions. 4 
This article analyzes the transfer problem in a model which, in its basic form, 
has become widely accepted in the trade literature in the last 10 odd years, 
incorporates the modern developments in international trade theory and by doing 
so embodies the 'styl ized' facts mentioned above. For ease of exposition attention 
is restricted to a two-country model involving just the donor and the recipient of 
the transfer. Incorporation of more countries, however, is straightforward, see 
Brakman and van Marrewijk (1991b). Since differences in the demand structure of 
donor and recipient are the driving force behind any transfer effects (with the 
exception of the direct income effect), we focus our analysis on different spending 
behavior and different demand elasticities for donor and recipient. 5 
The model distinguishes between two types of commodities, a basic commodity 
(called food) produced under constant returns to scale and a large number of 
manufactures produced under increasing returns to scale in monopolistic ompeti- 
tion. There is an externality in the model since consumers like an increase in the 
number of varieties of manufactures produced, but producers of these varieties do 
not take this into consideration. In equilibrium, therefore, not enough manufac- 
tures are produced and our analysis is about second-best welfare economics. In the 
absence of distortions lump-sum transfers only entail a movement along a given 
possibility locus, but with distortions there is a shift of the world utility possibility 
locus as well as a movement along it. 
The tying of aid is modeled following Schweinberger's (1990) 'forced choice' 
approach. The donor gives a transfer to the recipient on the condition that it spends 
2 See e.g. Kemp and Kojima (1985a), Kemp and Kojima (1985b) and Kemp and Kojima (1987), 
Schweinberger (1990), Kemp and Shimomura (1991) and Jepma (1991). 
3 See e.g. Krugman (1979), Krugman (1990), Lancaster (1980), Helpman (1981) and Ethier (1982). 
Choi and Yu (1987) are somewhat ofan exception as they analyze non-tied transfers under economies 
of scale in a two-good, two-country framework. The economies of scale however, are external to the 
firm, which therefore is still a pricetaker on the goods market. 
4 The 'stylized facts' are: (i) trade between DCs is usually intra-industry trade, while trade between 
DCs and LDCs is usually inter-industry ade, (ii) LDCs export a narrow range of primary products and 
depend for 'advanced' manufactured goods on DCs, while (iii) DCs export a wide range of different 
manufactured goods characterized by increasing returns to scale and can exercise some monopoly 
power. Clague (1991) tests a variant of the 'new' models for LDCs. 
5 Naturally, if demand is identical for donor and recipient transfers can still have real effects if aid is 
tied to a specific (group of) good(s). 
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at least the amount of the transfer on the specified good or group of goods. If the 
recipient freely chooses to spend more on the good to which the transfer is tied, 
then the tying of aid is not an effectively binding restriction and the welfare effects 
are identical to those for non-tied aid. 6 
We show furthermore that the imposition of a 'fictitious' restriction (i.e. 
imposing a restriction that is already fulfilled of tying aid to a specific manufac- 
tured good) can have real effects. In contrast to existing models this can explain 
the popularity of tied aid because as a result profits are made (which makes 
lobbying interesting) and the transfer itself is largely repatriated (hence one can 
appear to be more generous then one really is). 
2. The model 
The basic model, extensively documented by Tirole (1988), is by now well- 
known in international economic theory and has been developed, for example, by 
Dixit and Norman (1980) and Krugman (1990) to explain intra-industry trade. 
There will be a 'developed' country, A, and a 'less developed' country, B. 
Country A (the donor) gives a transfer (aid) to country B (the recipient). The 
transfer can be in the form of tied aid or non-tied aid. There are no tariffs, quotas 
or other barriers to trade. 
On the demand side two types of commodities are distinguished: (i) a standard 
basic commodity (or commodity bundle) which will be called food (F)  and serves 
as num6raire, and (ii) a range of differentiated manufactured goods. The manufac- 
tured goods will be indexed X i, i = 1 . . . . .  n.  From the consumers' point of view 
the manufactured goods are close but imperfect substitutes. Preferences are of the 
Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz type. 7
U k= ~' (Fk)l-'~k ; k=A,B ,  (1) 
i 
with 0 < c~ < 1 and 0 </3 k < 1. Naturally, X/k is the amount of manufactured 
good i which is consumed by country k = A,B. Hence flk is a monotone 
6 Should the recipient, for example, spend half its income on food consumption and aid is tied to 
food, then the tying restriction becomes binding only when the transfer exceeds the recipient's 
productive income! Presumably, therefore, most generic tied aid, such as aid tied to the consumption of
food or manufactures in general, is not effectively binding and therefore does not require a separate 
analysis despite the fact that aid can represent a substantial part (e.g. 77 percent of GNP recently for 
Mozambique) of a recipient's income. Naturally, non-generic tied aid, such as aid tied to a particular 
manufactured good, will be more easily binding. 
7 This is an application of the Leontief condition for aggregation, see e.g. van Daal and Merkies 
(1984). The utility function of the literature mentioned in the introduction is usually more general in the 
sense that it only assumes quasi-concavity. 
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transformation f the elasticity of substitution for manufactured goods (/3k = 1 - 
1 /e  k if ek is the elasticity of substitution for manufactured goods in country k) 
and ak represents he share of income spent on the consumption of manufactured 
goods. If the number of varieties is large, as we will assume, the Marshallian price 
elasticity of demand can be approximated by the elasticity of substitution for 
manufactured goods, see Horn (1984) for this approximation a d Dixit and Stiglitz 
(1993) for a recent discussion. We first develop the model under assumption 1
below and investigate differences in spending pattern in rich and poor countries. 
The consequences of different demand elasticities will be discussed briefly in 
Section 6. 
Assumption 1. The elasticity of demand is the same in both countries, i.e. 
/3 A =/3 B =/3, while the developed country spends a larger share of income on 
manufactured goods, i.e. aA > c~B. 
The basic good is produced in both countries using constant returns to scale 
technology. All factor markets are perfectly competitive. The production of 
manufactured goods requires special techniques and skilled labor and can only 
take place in the developed country A. As country B cannot produce manufactured 
goods it will only produce food at the amount I B, which also represents its income 
because food is the num6raire. The production of manufactured goods is character- 
ized by (internal) increasing returns to scale, where the non convexity only occurs 
on the comer. Hence production of each variety within the manufacturing industry 
sector will be undertaken by just one firm. It is most convenient to model the 
production process in two stages. 8 First, standard factors of production (capital 
and labor, say) are used to produce food and an intermediate good, M, under 
constant returns. This first step then leads to a standard production possibility 
curve G(M), with negative first and second derivative. 9 The tangent o the 
production possibility curve equals minus the price (r)  of intermediates, r = 
-G'(M). Second, the intermediate good is used to produce manufactured goods, 
each variety of which uses the same production technique. Internal increasing 
returns to scale are represented by the real fixed costs a (in terms of intermediates) 
and the (constant) marginal costs b (also in terms of intermediates). In equilibrium 
s The results derived below, however, also hold for an appropriately defined one-stage modeling 
procedure that uses only one factor of production, labor say. The advantages of this two-stage approach 
also used by Ethier and Horn (1984) is that different inputs, like labor, land and capital, can lead to the 
strictly concave production possibility curve above and that there is a clear choice in inputs devoted to 
the constant returns to scale part of the economy (food) on the one hand and the increasing returns to 
scale part of the economy (manufactures) on the other hand. 
9 Hence G(M) gives the amount of food country A can produce if it produces M of the intermediate 
good. Obviously, there is an upper bound, M say, to the amount of intermediates country A can 
produce which is dictated by the available amount of factors of production and technology. 
S. Brakman, C. van Marrewijk /Journal of Development Economics 47 (1995) 333-354 337 
all firms will produce the same output. Accordingly we can write this as (n equals 
the number of firms) 
M = n( a + bX).  (2) 
Furthermore, we have from the conditions of profit maximization i each industry 
(marginal cost equals marginal revenue): 
p/3 = rb. (3) 
From the fact that total profits in each industry are zero (otherwise new firms 
would enter the market) we have 1° 
pX = rM/n.  (4) 
Using Eqs. (2)-(4) we can derive the output of each firm in an industry: 
X = a/3/[ b(1 - /3  )]. (5) 
Applying Eqs. (2) and (5) gives the number of varieties as a function of the 
production of intermediates. 
n = [(1 - /3 ) /a lM (6) 
The demand functions for manufacturing products and food, which can be derived 
from utility maximization, are 
X~ = aklk/pn, (7) 
F k = (1 - ak) I  k. (8) 
Market clearing conditions and country A's income are: la 
X = [aAI A + aBIs] /pn,  (9) 
G(M)  +I  B = (1 - aa) I  a + (1 -- as ) I s ,  (10) 
I A = G(M)  + rM. (11) 
The model is determined (by Walras' law) by the equilibrium condition for the 
food sector and the production possibility curve. It is easy to incorporate transfers 
into the model, simply by subtracting T from A's income and adding it to B's 
income. 12 The model, now incorporating transfers, can be reduced to the following 
equation (use r = -G ' (M)  and Eq. (11)): 
L(M)  - - (1  - aA)G ' (M)M= aAG(M ) + {as I  B -  (a  A -  as )T  } 
=-Ru(M;T ). (12) 
The functions L(M)  and Ru(M; T) are defined for convenience. 
10 Note that, as usual, we abstract from the integer problem here. 
11 Note that in equilibrium there are no profits in the manufactured goods sector in country A, hence 
pnX = rM and I A = G(M)+ rM. 
12 The transfer could be made endogenous by relating it to either the donor's or recipient's 
expenditure or revenue level. Brakman and van Marrewijk (1991a), however, show that this has no 
material consequences for the analysis in the sequel. 
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As we are interested in the welfare consequences of transfers we also state the 
indirect utility function which is given by (Iff = k's disposable income, k = A, B) 
Ok=K~(p-~) (n6*) I~  for k=A,B ,  (13) 
with 
K k = (otk)'~'(1 - ozk)(1-'~'); q~k = o~k(1 - /3 ) / /3 .  
3. Non-tied aid 
First, we discuss non-tied aid. A priori one might expect his form of aid to be 
most beneficial for the recipient. Given the initial size of the transfer the initial 
equilibrium quantity of intermediates produced is determined by the unique point 
of intersection of the (upward-sloping) L-curve and the (downward-sloping) 
Ru-curve (where the u indicates untied aid) as defined in Eq. (12) above) 3An 
increase in non-tied aid does not affect the L-curve, but shifts the Ru-curve down 
by the amount (a  A -a  B) times the change in the transfer. This reduces the 
equilibrium production of intermediates, which in tum reduces the number of 
varieties produced, etc. These qualitative conclusions hold for discrete changes in 
the size of the transfer. The change in the production level of intermediates 
relative to the change in the transfer depends also on the (change in) the slopes of 
the L-curve and the Ru-curve. To gauge the size of this and related relative 
changes we use (local) calculus techniques. Differentiating (12) leads to 
/~ / /Z  = - - (o~ A - OdB)//[1 + (1 -- Of A) or ] <0 ,  (14) 
with 
- dT/rM; or = MG"/G'. 
Hence T denotes the change of the transfer in relation to total world spending on 
manufactured goods and or is the elasticity of substitution in the supply of 
intermediates. All other ' ^' signs refer to relative changes, i.e. )t4 r = dM/M,  etc. 
Since ~ = o-)kl, /3 = ~ (Eq. 3) and h = )14 (Eq. 6) we get 
Proposition 1. Under Assumption 1 a non-tied transfer induces: 
i a price decrease for all manufactured goods, 
ii a decrease in the number of varieties in the manufactured goods industry, 
iii an increase in the production and consumption of food. 
13 Examples of these curves are given in Figs. 1 and 2 below. Note that the R-curve is concave and 
L(0) = 0. 
S. Brakman, C. van Marrewijk /Journal of Development Economics 47 (1995) 333-354 339 
Proposition 1 can be given the usual interpretation. If country A transfers income 
to country B and country B spends a smaller portion out of this income on 
manufactures, then the price of manufactures falls, which in this setting causes a 
concomitant fall in the number of varieties. 
The relative change in indirect utility can be calculated from Eq. (13). Let o k 
be the share of the domestically produced value of manufactured products in 
disposable income, i.e. to A = rM/IdA and to B = 0. Since country A (B) is a net 
exporter (importer) of manufactured goods we have to A - ot A > 0 (O) B -- O~ B < 0).  
Let ~/k be country k 's  disposable income over the world value of manufactured 
products, i.e. ~/A = Id / rM (---- 1/toA in this two-country world) and ~a = Ida~ rM 
(:# 1/OJa). Then we get I° g ----rOAr--#(i/~/A) and id = #(1/~/B) and welfare 
effects 
~A = ( tOA -- OtA)/3 + ~bAn -- (1 / r /A )#< 0, (15) 
6 B = ( rOB -- OrB)/3 + q~B h + (1/ ' r /B)#.  (16) 
Note that, in contrast o traditional transfer models, the welfare effects consist of 
three rather than two components. There is not only the terms-of-trade effect and 
the income effect, but also a ' love-of-variety' effect. The latter is the positive 
externality associated with the production of manufactured goods (not taken into 
consideration by the producers). Hence in (the non-Pareto-optimal) equilibrium 
there is an under-production of the number of manufactured goods. This under- 
production will be exacerbated by an increase in the transfer as it further reduces 
the number of varieties produced. Note that this externality, the love-of-variety 
effect, is smaller the easier it is to substitute one manufactured good for another (if 
/3 increases and therefore ~A and ~B fall)f4 
The donor's welfare is reduced for three reasons: (i) there is a negative 
terms-of-trade effect [(o.) A -- t~ A) /~ ( 0] because the price of manufactured goods 
falls and the donor is a net exporter of these goods, (ii) there is a negative variety 
effect because the fall in the price of manufactured goods induces a reduction in 
the number of varieties produced (thg h < 0) and (iii) there is a negative income 
effect due to the transfer itself [--(1/~TA)# < 0]. 15 
14 In an earlier version we erroneously wrote that "this effect disappears if manufactured goods 
become perfect substitutes". However, the distortion due to imperfect competition does not quite 
disappear if/3 approaches one (and therefore both ~b A and q5 n approach zero) because then the number 
of varieties becomes mall and we cannot "abstract from the integer problem" (see footnote 10) 
anymore as the market will move into a form of oligopoly or monopoly. Addressing this issue would 
require the modeling of varieties as a continuum of goods. We are very grateful to an anonymous 
referee for pointing this out. 
I5 It should be clear that if we extend the model to three or more countries those countries not 
directly involved in the transfer will only face the terms-of-trade effect and the love-of-variety effect, 
see Brakman and van Marrewijk (1991b). 
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The recipient is faced with two positive effects and one negative ffect. As the 
recipient is a net exporter of food the terms-of-trade effect is positive, as is, of 
course, its direct income effect. In fact, the latter effect will usually be quite large 
as the recipient's income tends to be small compared to the world expenditures on 
manufactured goods. The love-of-variety effect is negative, however, as the 
number of varieties declines. Therefore the net welfare effect for the recipient is 
inconclusive because the love-of-variety effect may potentially dominate both the 
terms-of-trade effect and the direct income effect. A sufficient condition for O B to 
be positive is (E -1 )o -> 1, with E= 1 / (1 - /3 )  representing the elasticity of 
demand for a particular product in the manufacturing sector. 16 Therefore the 
recipient's welfare improves if the product of demand and supply elasticity is 
sufficiently high. Recent empirical work in a similar framework by Gasiorek et al. 
(1991) reports very large values for the elasticity of demand, consistent with the 
work by Abraham (1991), ranging from 5.8 to 35. If we take E close to 6, the 
lowest estimate of Gasiorek et al., then an elasticity of supply of intermediates 
exceeding 0.2 would already be sufficient o guarantee that the recipient gains 
from the transfer. This condition will appear frequently throughout the rest of the 
paper, so we will give it a name. 
Elasticity condition. We say the elasticity condition holds iff (E -  1)tr > 1, i.e. 
iff the demand for manufactured goods and the supply of intermediates i
sufficiently elastic, which is equivalent to saying that the terms-of-trade effect 
dominates the love-of-variety effect. 
This leads us to the following proposition. 
Proposition 2. Under Assumption I the welfare ffects of non-tied aid are always 
negative for the donor. The elasticity condition is sufficient o ensure that the 
recipient gains from non-tied aid. 
4. Tied aid 
This section discusses, in turn, two forms of generic tied aid: aid tied to food 
(' humanitarian' aid) and aid tied to manufactured goods in general. 
16 This condition is derived by combining the first two terms on the right-hand side of Eq. (16). 
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4.1. Aid tied to food 
First, we look at 'humanitarian' aid, i.e. aid tied to the consumption of food. 
The recipient maximizes Eq. (1) subject o the two restrictions 
n 
~_~pXi B + F B <_I B + T, (17) 
i=1  
F B > T, (18) 
where the first restriction is the budget constraint and the second restriction is the 
tying-of-aid constraint, representing the donor's condition that the recipient should 
spend at least the amount of the transfer on food consumption. Obviously, if the 
transfer is relatively small the recipient will voluntarily choose to spend more on 
food than the size of the transfer and the second restriction, Eq. (18), is not 
binding. As a result the same demand relations as before are operative, i.e. Eqs. 
(7) and (8). Consequently, within a certain range of transfers the tying-of-aid 
restriction is said to be not effective and within this range the effects of tied aid on 
welfare, prices, the number of varieties, etc. are the same as those for non-tied aid 
analyzed in the previous ection. The analysis of tied aid becomes interesting if the 
tying-of-aid restriction is effective and the second restriction is binding. In that 
case the following demand relations hold: 
Xi B = I~/pn  i=  l ..... n, 
F B = T, 
which leads to the indirect utility function 
0 B = (p -=. ) (n6 . ) (Z~. )T (1 -~. ) .  
The food market equilibrium becomes 17 
G(M)  +I  B = (1 - aA) ( I  a -- T) + T. 
From which the equilibrium production 
(19) 
(20) 
(21) 
(22) 
level of intermediates (using r = 
-G ' (M)  and Eq. (11)) can be determined as follows: 
L( M)  = aAG( M ) + {I B -  aar  } =- Rtf( M;  T ). (12') 
Equilibrium conditions (12) (for non-tied aid) and (12') (for aid tied to food) 
differ only in the term appearing in braces in the R-function. The discussion above 
is illustrated in Fig. 1. Suppose the initial equilibrium is at point E 0 with the initial 
transfer T O (which could be zero). An increase of the transfer from T O to T 1 shifts 
the R-curve down to Ru(M; T 1) if aid is non-tied and results in equilibrium Ea, as 
analyzed in Section 3. Now note that an increase in the transfer from T O to T~ if 
17 Note, that country B's preferences do not play a role in determining the terms of trade, but country 
B's technology does, see Schweinberger (1990). 
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L(M) 
"". E1 
E'2 
E2 
EO 
Ru(M;TO) 
Ru(M;T I ) -  
, ' -Rt f (M;T1)  
', Ru(M;T2) 
Rtf(M;T2)  
0 M 
Fig. 1. The magnification effect of aid tied to food. 
aid is tied to food but the tying restriction (18) is not effective also results in a 
downward shift of the R-curve to Rtf(M; T 1) = Ru(M; T 1) and therefore also 
results in equilibrium E 1. Suppose that at T 1 the tying-to-food restriction (18) 
becomes just binding, i.e. (1 -  aB)( I  B + T 1) = T 1. A further increase of the 
transfer from T 1 to T 2 results in a further downward shift of the R-curve to 
R,(M;  T 2) and equilibrium E~ if aid is non-tied, but to a larger downward shift to 
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R~(M; T z) < Ru(M; T 2) and equilibrium E 2 if aid is tied to food. Therefore we 
can conclude that, independently of the size of the transfer, aid tied to food leads 
to larger decreases in the price of manufactures, the number of varieties produced, 
etc. than non-tied aid provided the tying restriction (18) is effective. To put it 
differently, tying aid to food results in a 'magnification effect'. 
Fig. 1 also clarifies another important aspect of tied aid. If we want to gauge 
the impact of aid tied to food instead of non-tied aid by comparing the size of 
various relative changes using calculus techniques, as we did in the previous 
section, we can do that usefully only at one point. We noted above that if the 
transfer is small (the tying-of-aid restriction is not effective) there is no difference 
between the effects of the two types of aid. If the transfer is large (the tying-of-aid 
restriction is effective), however, there is a difference. Suppose that we compare 
the effect of a small change in the transfer if aid is tied relative to untied aid 
starting from an initially large transfer like T 2 in Fig. 1. This would be like 
comparing apples and oranges since we would be comparing changes at two 
different initial equilibria, E 2 and E~ respectively, which affects, in particular, the 
elasticity of substitution in the supply of intermediates or. Therefore, the initial 
transfer must be large enough such that there is a difference between tied aid and 
non-tied aid, whereas the transfer must be small enough in order to evaluate both 
at the same initial equilibrium point. The only initial transfer that satisfies both 
these criteria is transfer T t in Fig. 1 in which the tying-of-aid restriction (18) is 
just binding. Evaluation at that point (E  t in Fig. 1) also implies that Eq. (16) still 
holds (see the appendix). A further advantage of this approach is that the 
modelling of tied aid can then also be given Professor Kemp's interpretation of 
marginal tying, see Schweinberger (1990), since the outcome of the two ap- 
proaches then coincide. Professor Kemp argues that the relevant constraint hat 
might be imposed by the donor country is that additional food consumption (if aid 
is tied to food) as a consequence of an increase in the transfer must be at least as 
great as the increase in the transfer. 18 Differentiation leads to 19 
r[tf =/3[tf = o'hhf = o'M[tf = [teA/( Or' A - -  O~B) ] r "~ r < 0. (23) 
From this equation and the above discussion it is clear that the price and variety 
changes are larger (in absolute value) if aid is tied to food instead of non-tied. 
More precisely, these changes are aA/ (a  A -- a B) > 1 times as large. This is easy 
to understand as the recipient is forced, through the tying of aid, to spend the 
18 The disadvantage of this interpretation is that it requires the introduction of a separate entity, the 
recipient's government, to receive the transfer, spent it as specified and distribute it to the private 
sector, as noted by Kemp and Kojima (1985a). Furthermore, the private sector is not supposed totake 
this into consideration in their own demand functions. Should these conditions fail then marginal tying 
coincides with untied aid unless the transfer is 'large'. 
19 The Ire sign indicates that aid is tied to food. 
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entire increase of the transfer exclusively on food consumption, rather than just the 
fraction (1 - aB)" The welfare changes are given by 
0AItf = ( oJ, - aA)/31tf + ~bAhhf- (1/~/A)/~ < 6 A < 0, (24) 
O.Itf = (~OB - ~B)/3ltf + ~b.hltf + ( l / 'qB)/~.  (25) 
Hence welfare for the donor decreases more due to a larger terms-of- trade 
effect and a larger love-of-variety effect. The recipient of the transfer has a larger 
welfare gain due to the tying of aid to food, which forces it to use its monopoly 
power, relative to non-tied aid if and only if the elasticity condition holds, i.e. if 
and only if the terms-of-trade (monopoly) effect dominates the love-of-variety 
effect. One could therefore say that humanitarian aid is truly humanitarian if and 
only if the elasticity condition holds. 
Proposition 3. Under Assumption 1 aid tied to food compared to non-tied aid 
causes 
i a larger welfare decrease for the donor, 
ii larger decreases in the price and number of manufactured goods, 
iii a larger welfare gain for the recipient iff the elasticity condition holds. 
4.2. Aid tied to manufactures in general 
Sometimes, aid is not tied to a specific good (as discussed in Section 5), but the 
tying is 'coordinated' between donors to manufactures in general (see for exam- 
ples of multi-country tying Jepma, 1991). It should come as no surprise that this 
case represents the mirror image of aid tied to food. The tying-of-aid constraint 
becomes 
n 
~F~pXi B > T. (26) 
i=1  
If this constraint is not effective, i.e. if the transfer is small, then generic tying 
of aid to manufactures has the same implications as non-tied aid because restric- 
tion (26) is not binding. If the transfer is large enough, i.e. if restriction (26) is 
binding, the demand relations are 
X~ = T/pN,  
F B = I B. 
And the market clearing condition for food becomes z° 
G(M)  +IB = (1 -- 0 tA) ( /A -  T)  + I , ,  
(27) 
(28) 
(29) 
2o Note again that he terms of trade can be determined without reference tothe recipient's preference 
or technology if aid is tied to the donor's export good, see also Schweinberger (1990). 
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Ru(M;T2) 
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Fig. 2. The reversal effect of aid tied to manufactures in general. 
from which the equilibrium production level of intermediates (using r = - G'(M) 
and Eq. (11)) can be determined as follows: 
L(M)  = aAG(M)  + {(1 - ah)T} ~Rtm(M;T  ). (12") 
Equilibrium conditions (12) (for non-tied aid) and (12") (for aid tied to 
manufactures in general) also differ only in the term appearing in braces in the 
R-function. The situation is illustrated in Fig. 2. Starting from the initial equilib- 
rium at point E 0 with the initial transfer T o (which could be zero) an increase of 
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the transfer from T O to T 1 shifts the R-curve down to Ru(M; T 1) if aid is non-tied 
and results in equilibrium E 1, as analyzed in Section 3. Similarly, an increase in 
the transfer from T O to T 1 if aid is tied to manufactures in general but the tying 
restriction (26) is not effective also results in a downward shift of the R-curve to 
Rtm(M; T 1) = Ru(M; T 1) and therefore also results in equilibrium E r Suppose that 
at T 1 the tying-to-manufactures triction (26) becomes just binding, i.e. aB(I B 
+ T 1) = T r A further increase of the transfer from T 1 to T 2 results in a further 
downward shift of the R-curve to Ru(M; T 2) and equilibrium E~ if aid is non-tied. 
In contrast, a further increase of the transfer from T 1 to T 2 leads to an upward 
shift to Rtm(M; T2) > Rtm(M; T 1) = Ru(M; T 1) > Ru(M; T 2) and equilibrium E 2 if 
aid is tied to food. Therefore we can conclude that, independently of the size of 
the transfer, aid tied to manufactures in general leads to opposite effects on the 
price of manufactures, the number of varieties produced, etc. than non-tied aid 
provided the tying restriction (26) is effective. To put it differently, tying aid to 
manufactures in general eads to a 'reversal effect'. 
For the reasons discussed in Section 4.1 we evaluate derivatives at the same 
initial equilibrium, in which the tying-of-aid restriction (26) is just binding. 
Differentiation leads to 21 
rltm =Pltrn = o 'n l tm ~-- O ' /~ l tm = - - [ (1  - aA) / (  Ot A -- aB) ] ?> 0 > ~. (30) 
From which it is immediately clear that the price and variety changes are 
positive rather than negative if aid is tied to manufactures in general instead of 
non-tied. This follows from the fact that the recipient is forced, through the tying 
of aid, to spend the increase of the transfer exclusively on the consumption of 
manufactures, rather than just the fraction a a, which is what the donor would 
have spent on manufactures from that part of its income. This, then, leads to an 
increase in the demand for manufactures and hence an increase in its price and the 
quantity supplied through an increase in the number of varieties. The welfare 
changes are given by 
l~Altm = ((.0 A --  aA) / ) l t  m -Jr- ~)Ahltm - -  (1/r/A)7~ > 1~a, (31) 
t~Bltm = (tO B -- aB)/31t m + 6B~ltm + ( I /~ /s )T .  (32) 
The donor is now faced with a positive terms-of-trade effect and a positive 
love-of-variety effect, but a negative direct income effect. Its welfare decrease will 
be smaller than if aid is non-tied. Indeed, the donor may even gain through the 
tying of aid to manufactures if the love-of-variety effect dominates the direct 
income effect. The recipient, on the other hand, is confronted with two positive 
effects and one negative effect. As before, its direct income effect is positive 
because it receives the transfer. The terms-of-trade effect is now negative as the 
21 The Itm sign indicates that aid is tied to manufactures in general. 
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price of manufactured goods rises; an effect which may be potentially counterbal- 
anced by the positive love-of-variety effect if the elasticity condition does not 
hold. The benefit of tying aid to manufactures is the increase in the number of 
varieties produced, a positive externality for all countries involved. Aid tied to 
manufactures will therefore l ad to an outward shift of the utility possibility locus, 
rather than an inward shift (as would be the case with non-tied aid or aid tied to 
food). 
Proposition 4. Under Assumption 1 aid tied to manufactures in general com- 
pared to non-tied aid induces 
i a price increase for all manufactured goods, 
ii an increase in the number of varieties in the manufactured goods industry, 
iii a smaller welfare loss (or possibly a welfare gain) for the donor, 
iv a smaller welfare gain for the recipient iff the elasticity condition holds. 
It has become clear from Propositions 2-4 that some transfer paradoxes cannot 
be ruled out. In particular, if aid is non-tied or tied to food the recipient's welfare 
may fall (and hence everyone is worse off), while if aid is tied to manufactures the 
donor's welfare may rise (and hence everyone may gain). Simulations uggest that 
these paradoxes only occur for very small values of /3 (close to 0.01), and hence 
very high values of ~b k (= otk(1-/3 )//3 ), and are largely independent of the other 
parameters in the model, see Brakman and van Marrewijk (1991b) for details. Low 
values of b correspond to an elasticity of demand close to one, much lower than 
the lowest empirical estimate (5.8) found by Gasiorek et al. (1991). We therefore 
do not consider it very likely for transfer paradoxes to occur in practice. 
5. A fictitious restriction? 
The previous ection discussed generic tied aid, i.e. aid tied to food in general 
or to manufactures in general. In reality, however, if aid is tied it is usually tied to 
a specific good produced in the donor country. For example, Japan gives aid to 
Indonesia provided the money is used to buy tractors in Japan. 22 Without loss of 
generality we assume the specific good to be good X 1. Suppose, then, in the same 
vein as in the previous ection, that the world is in an initial equilibrium in which 
country A gives non-tied aid to country B and that this transfer is just large 
enough for country B to pay for the purchase of manufacturing good X1, which is 
imported from country A, i.e. T = p[ o~B(I B+ T)/pn]. One might be tempted to 
argue that the mere proclamation by country A that henceforth aid is tied to the 
purchase of manufacturing good X 1 would not alter the equilibrium in the world 
22 The transfer is, of course, still given in terms of the numeraire, with Eq. (33) as tying restriction. 
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economy since the restriction imposed is already fulfilled by the current equilib- 
rium (and therefore appears to be a fictitious restriction). This reasoning would be 
wrong, however, as we will now explain. 
The recipient solves the maximization problem subject o the budget constraint 
and the tying-of-aid constraint 
plX1B > T. (33) 
If the tying of aid constraint is binding expenditures on good X 1 are equal to 
the transfer and the remainder of the income is used to buy the other (n - 1) 
manufactured goods and food which leads to the following demand relations for 
the recipient: 
X~ = T /P1 ,  (34) 
Xi a = aa la / /p (n  -- 1), i=  2 ..... n, (35) 
F B = (1 -- aa) I  B. (36) 
The producer of good X 1 can take advantage of the restriction being imposed 
upon the consumers in the less developed country. If he could charge different 
prices in the two countries he could set the price in country B arbitrarily high and 
still receive revenue T because demand for manufactured good X 1 in country B is 
now unit elastic (while a higher price means lower quantity demanded and hence 
lower cost). We assume, however, that consumer arbitrage between the two 
countries forces the producer of good X 1 to charge the same price in both 
countries. Let e A (%)  be the elasticity of demand in country A (B), let ~ be the 
overall elasticity of demand and let 0 A be the share of sales in country A, i.e. 
0 A = xA/ (x  A + Xa),  then the following relation holds: 
~.i=OAEA-lt-(1--OA)~.B i=1  ..... n, (37) 
that is, the overall elasticity of demand is a weighted average of the elasticity of 
demand in the two countries. For all producers i -- 2,...,n, we have e A = 1/(1 - 
f l )=e  B and hence e i=1/ (1 - /3 )=e,  say. 23 For the producer of good 1, 
however, e A = 1/(1 - /3 )  > 1 = % and hence e I ~ I~. Since all producers equate 
marginal revenue and marginal cost according to the rule 
pi[1 - 1/E i ]  = rb (38) 
this implies that the producer of good X 1 charges a higher price than his 
competitors which allows him to make a profit. As a result the sales of each 
competitor i = 2 ..... n at the old price will increase slightly, which leads to profits, 
23 The reader should not be tempted to deduce from Eq. (35) that he demand for manufactures Xi, 
i > 1, is unit elastic because this equation already uses the fact that all prices Pi, i > 1, are the same. 
An individual producer has no control over the other prices, indeed takes these as given, from which 
follows demand elasticity 1/(1-/3). 
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which in turn causes an increase in the price and number of varieties produced. 
Proposition 5. The imposition of an 'imaginary" constraint, tying aid to a 
specific manufactured good, causes 
i a price increase for all manufactured goods, 
ii an increase in the number of varieties, 
iii a higher price for the manufactured good to which aid is tied than for the 
other manufactured goods, 
iv profits for the producer of the good to which aid is tied. 
The 'fictitious' restriction has real effects because it affects the elasticity of 
demand for the 'privileged' producer. Obviously, the possibility for the 'privi- 
leged' producer to have positive profits if aid is tied to the production of its good 
explains both the envy of other producers, who will object to this practice, and the 
existence of lobby groups for certain producers in trying to acquire the 'privi- 
leged' status. Effectively, the tying of aid to a specific manufactured good in the 
donor country largely repatriates the transfer in terms of profits for this manufac- 
turing good industry. Therefore, countries involved to a large extent in this type of 
tied aid practice appear much more generous than they really are. 
6. Differences in demand elasticity 
Naturally, under Assumption 1 a manufacturing firm, in the absence of tariffs, 
quotas or transport costs, will automatically charge the same price in both 
countries because the elasticity of demand is the same in both countries. Even if 
demand elasticities differ between countries a producer will be forced to charge 
the same price in both countries through consumer arbitrage if consumers in 
country A (B) can purchase goods in country B (A), as we assumed in Section 5. 
We will now briefly investigate the consequences of differences in demand 
elasticity between donor and recipient. For clarity in exposition we will use 
Assumption 2, but it is of course trivial to change the relation between /3 A and 
fiB .24 
24 Empirical evidence does not support Assumption 2 (nor the alternative, i.e. demand ismore elastic 
in less developed countries). Just restricting ourselves, for example, to the large developed countries 
(Germany, France, Italy, United Kingdom, United States and Japan) compared tothe less developed 
countries (Rest of the World) in table 19 of Stalioner (1987) shows that 16 times demand is more 
elastic in the developed countries, while 14 times demand is more elastic in the less developed 
countries. One would therefore have to investigate he consequences of aid on a case by case basis. 
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Assumption 2. The elasticity of demand is higher in the developed country than 
in the less developed country, i.e. fA > fn, while the share of income spent on 
manufactured goods is identical in both countries, i.e. aA = an = a. 
Suppose, furthermore, that the producer of a manufactured good can take 
advantage of the different elasticities of demand in each market and can set 
different prices in different markets. This implies, from the marginal revenue 
equals marginal cost condition, that the price charged for manufactured goods will 
be higher in country B than in country A. 
PA flA = rb, (39) 
PB fiB = rb. (40) 
The zero-profit condition changes to 
pA XA + pB XB ---- rM/n (41) 
where X a (X B) is consumption i country A (B) given by 
X A = a( I  A - r ) lPAn , (42) 
X B = ot(I B + T)lPBn. (43) 
Equilibrium in the food market gives 
I~+G(M)=(1-c~) [ ( IA -T  )+( IB+T) ]  =(1- -a ) ( IA  +IB) (44) 
and is therefore independent of the size of the transfer. Equilibrium in the food 
market, using I A = G(M) + rM,  reduces to 
a( l  B + G( M) )  + (1 -  a)G'(  M)M= 0 (45) 
which determines the quantity of intermediates produced. This then sequentially 
gives F, r, PA, PB and I A. Solving for the number of varieties we get 
n = (1 - f lB)M/a -- ( fA - -  BIB)( °t/ra)(IA -- T) (46) 
from which it readily follows that an increase in the transfer leads to an increase in 
the number of varieties produced iff demand is more elastic in the donor country 
than in the recipient country ( fg > BIB)" 
Proposition 6. Under Assumption 2 and price discrimination an increase in the 
transfer from country A to country B 
i does not change the equilibrium prices of food and intermediates, nor the 
equilibrium production quantities of food and intermediates, 
ii increases the number of varieties produced, 
iii leads to a welfare gain for the recipient. 
The results from Proposition 6 are intuitively straightforward to explain. 
Suppose that country A increases the transfer to country B. Since donor and 
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recipient spend an equal proportion of this income on food consumption the 
equilibrium condition in the food market is not changed, hence the production 
level of food and intermediates is not affected by the transfer. This means that the 
price of intermediates, the income level I A and the prices for manufactures 
charged in the different countries do not change. The only things that do change 
are the consumption levels in countries A and B and the number of varieties 
produced. Recall the spending levels of countries A and B on a representative 
manufactured good. 
X a = a( I  A -- T) /pAn , 
X B = a( l~  + T) /pBn.  
Hence given the produced number of varieties (n) an increase in the transfer T 
will shift demand away from country A to country B where the price is higher 
(because demand is less elastic in country B). This will therefore increase revenues 
without increasing costs, which attracts new firms into the market, thereby 
reducing the quantity demanded for an individual producer at a given price level 
such that profits are again zero. Under these conditions, then, a transfer leads to an 
increase in the number of varieties produced and to an outward shift of the utility 
possibility locus. The donor is confronted with a negative income effect and a 
positive love-of-variety effect, while the recipient is confronted with a positive 
income effect and a positive love-of-variety effect (and therefore gains from an 
increase in the transfer). 
What happens if the manufacturer cannot charge different prices in the two 
markets? Basically the same results still hold, because an increase in the transfer 
does not affect he food market equilibrium condition while demand has shifted to 
the country with a lower demand elasticity which therefore raises prices and the 
number of intermediates produced. 
7. Conclusions 
Kemp and Kojima (1985a) show the possibility of transfer paradoxes if aid is 
tied in a Walrasian stable, two-good, two-country framework. This result can be 
understood in terms of familiar esults either by realizing that there are really three 
agents (the government) or that the tying itself represents a distortion. Schwein- 
berger (1990) models aid in terms of 'forced choices' and shows that under tied 
aid the model is decomposable (the terms of trade are independent of the 
preferences of the recipient). We derive the same results while restricting our- 
selves, in contrast to the above contributions, to Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz preferences 
in a popular, non-Pareto-optimal trade model which also incorporates increasing 
returns to scale and imperfect competition. We have three basic new results. First, 
there are three, rather than two, welfare effects, i.e. in addition to the well-known 
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terms-of-trade effect and direct income effect there is a love-of-variety effect 
which may potentially dominate the other two effects. This third welfare effect 
becomes less important if the elasticity of substitution for manufactured goods 
increases. Second, if the donor spends more on manufactures than the recipient 
(with equal demand elasticity): (i) the price of manufactures and the number of 
varieties decreases and the donor always loses if aid is non-tied, while the 
recipient gains if an elasticity condition is fulfilled; (ii) non-tied aid leads to an 
inward shift of the utility possibility locus; (iii) the results from (i) and (ii) are 
magnified if aid is tied to food and reversed if aid is tied to manufactures in 
general; (iv) welfare paradoxes are possible if the elasticity of demand is close to 
one, and (v) the imposition of tied aid with respect o a specific manufactured 
good increases the price of this good and enables the producer of that good to 
make a profit, thereby largely repatriating the transfer. Third, if the donor's 
demand is more elastic than the recipient's (with equal spending patterns) then an 
increase in aid does not change the terms of trade but increases both the number of 
varieties produced and the welfare level of the recipient (and leads to an outward 
shift of the utility possibility locus). 
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Appendix A 
This appendix shows that Eq. (16) in the text still holds if aid is tied to food if 
the tying is just effective, i.e. if (1 - c~B)(I a + T) = T. The demand relations for 
country B are 
Xi ~ =Ia /pn ,  i=  1 ..... n, (A.1) 
F B = T, (A.2) 
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which leads to the indirect utility function 
19 a : ( p -~) (n4 ,B)  ( I~B)T(1- as) (A.3) 
Differentiating (A.3) results in ( I  B is given) 
OB = -a~,b  + 4~Bh + (1 - aB)(OT/T) 
= - aB/3 + '#a~ + (1 -- an)  ( rM/T) (dT / rM)  
= --aB/3 + thnh + (1 - aB)[rM/(I B + T)] [( I~ + T)/T]'F 
= -aBp + ~bah + (1 - aa) (1 / r /B  ) [ ( In  + T)/T]f 
= - aB/3 + thBh + (1/r /B)/~ 
because (1 - otB)[(I B + T)/T] = 1 if tying is just effective. Showing that Eq. (16) 
in the text still holds if aid is tied to manufactures in general if the tying is just 
effective is entirely analogous. 
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